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“This is the happy warrior, This is he…” 
 
—Sir Herbert Read1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Discovering that the United States government has 
experimented on unwitting and un-consenting American citizens is a 
difficult pill to swallow, especially when some of those American 
citizens are United States Armed Forces service members.  This 
scenario begs the question: what happens now?  Now that the U.S. 
government has finished its classified experimentation, where does 
this leave the soldier who wanted to defend and serve his country, but 
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1 Sir Herbert Read, The Happy Warrior, in THE WAR POETS 138 (Robert Giddings 
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is now a victim of his government?  Where does this leave “the happy 
warrior”?2  
 This paper will explore the top-secret Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) human medical experiment, MKULTRA, and the 
possible avenues of relief for service members involved in the project.  
First, the veteran may bring suit against the U.S. government for 
constitutional violations, or in a civil tort action.  However, due to the 
evolution of the doctrine and cases such as Chappell v. Wallace, 
United States v. Stanley, and Feres v. United States, veterans will 
likely be unable to recover a remedy in court.3 
Second, a veteran may recover under the Department of 
Veterans’ Affairs (VA) disability compensation system.4  Service-
connected disability compensation is a monthly, monetary benefit paid 
to a veteran upon a showing to the VA that the veteran was disabled 
due to an injury arising out of, or aggravated by, their active-duty 
military service.5  However, a veteran used as an unwitting test subject 
in MKULTRA would have a difficult time surmounting the burden of 
proof the VA system requires.  But given recent court decisions, 
namely AZ v. Shinseki, it may be possible to alleviate some of the 
veteran’s burden of proof involving MKULTRA claims.6  
 This article will take a brief look into the history of human 
medical trials, followed by a history of the CIA program MKULTRA, 
and other related programs.  Next, it will explore case law that bars 
veterans from constitutional remedies as well as tort remedies against 
the U.S. government.  Finally, the article will discuss challenges for 
veterans in the VA disability compensation system to determine if 
MKULTRA victims could successfully seek service-connection.  
Ultimately, a veteran attempting to recover damages from MKULTRA 
testing will likely be unable to prevail under a constitutional analysis, 
but an MKULTRA victim may be able to seek service-connection 
under the VA.  
 
 
                                                 
 
2 See Read, supra note 1.    
3 See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 
296 (1983); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).   
4 See 38 C.F.R. § 3.4 (2013).  
5 See id.; see also Veterans with Service-Connected Disabilities, FEDERAL BENEFITS 
FOR 
VETERANS, DEPENDENTS AND SURVIVORS, DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF. 34 (2014), 
available at 
http://www.va.gov/opa/publications/benefits_book/2014_Federal_Benefits_for_Vete
rans_English.pdf. 
6 See AZ v. Shinseki, 731 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF MEDICAL ETHICS 
 
 Throughout the course of American history, science has 
demanded discovery.  However, when answering the call of duty, 
scientists, whether privately-funded or government-sponsored, have 
frequently tested drug technologies on humans.7  During the 1960s, the 
United States began scrutinizing how scientists were acquiring their 
information, and a new change in physician ethics emerged.8  The 
evolution called for new ideals regarding informed consent.9  To 
comply, the National Institute of Health (NIH) issued a new clinical 
manual requiring informed consent.10  Unfortunately, the manual did 
not provide a precise definition of the term.11  However, it did require 
a volunteer to sign a statement prior to participating in the medical 
trial, asserting the volunteer “understand[s] the project and agree[s] to 
participate in it,” and, if the volunteer “find[s] [his/her] assigned 
project to be intolerable, [the volunteer] may withdraw from it.”12   
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) followed suit, 
although it defined informed consent as “the person [having] the 
ability to exercise choice.”13  It further required the person “receive a 
‘fair explanation’ of the procedure, including an understanding of the 
experiment’s purpose and duration, ‘all inconveniences and hazards 
reasonably to be expected,’ the nature of a controlled trial (and the 
possibility of going on a placebo), and any existing alternative forms 
of therapy available.”14  
 The spark of this “most remarkable—and thoroughly 
controversial—transformation” was media coverage of various private 
medical trials.15  In 1962, one example caught the attention of 
Congress and the media when a drug, not yet evaluated by the FDA, 
was given “on an experimental basis” to women at risk for 
complications such as “spontaneous abortion” and “premature 
                                                 
 
7 See DAVID J. ROTHMAN, STRANGERS AT THE BEDSIDE: A HISTORY OF HOW LAW 
AND BIOETHICS TRANSFORMED MEDICAL DECISION MAKING 1 (1991). 
8 Id. at 88-89. 
9 Id. at 89. 
10 Id. at 91.  
11 Id.  
12 Id. at 92.  
13 Id. at 93.  
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 1; see also id. at 74.  One study, for example, occurred in an institution for 
mentally ill children where a mild form of hepatitis was endemic.  Id.  The existing 
presence of the virus was used as grounds for artificially introducing the hepatitis 
virus to other children in the home.  Id.  When the study was publicized, it was 
described as “risk[ing]… injury… for the benefit of others.”  Id. 
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delivery.”16  The drug was taken by 20,000 American women, which 
included 3,750 women of childbearing age and 624 pregnant women.17  
However, these women did not know they were part of an 
experimental drug testing program and, as such, had not given 
informed consent.18   
 Thereafter, a Senator from New York, Jacob Javits, proposed 
an amendment to the Kefauver Bill, which enabled pharmaceutical 
medication testing for safety and efficacy, to compel:  
 
the secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) 
to issue regulations that no such [experimental] drug 
may be administered to any human being in any clinical 
investigation unless . . . that human being has been 
appropriately advised that such drug has not been 
determined to be safe in use for human beings.19  
 
However, Senator Javits’ amendment to the bill was not successful.20 
 Almost a decade later, Congress again discovered a grave 
miscarriage of ethical considerations.  In 1972, the Tuskegee syphilis 
experiments became known to the public.21  Initiated by the U.S. 
Public Health Service, the Tuskegee syphilis program began in 1932, 
and it focused on African-American men from the South who were 
believed to be “particularly susceptible to venereal diseases.”22  Over 
600 men were recruited, two-thirds of which were given the live 
syphilis virus.23  Although the participants were told they were being 
treated for “bad blood,” they received “painful diagnostic procedures” 
that would implant and grow syphilis, rather than treat it.24  The men 
involved also received mercury treatments that eased the symptoms of 
syphilis.25   
                                                 
 
16 Id. at 63-64.  
17 Id. at 64.  
18 Id.  
19 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
20 Id. at 64, 66-67 (explaining that the Javits amendment, once it merged from the 
legislature, required consent “except where [investigators] deem it not feasible or, in 
their best professional judgment, contrary to the best interests of such human 
beings,” essentially leaving consent up to the discretion of researchers). 
21 KELLY BARTH, HUMAN MEDICAL TRIALS 25 (2005).  
22 Id. at 11-12.  
23 Id. at 26, 40.  
24 Id. at 12 (citation omitted).  Also note that, beginning in the 1940s, penicillin could 
have been used to treat syphilis, but none of the participants were given penicillin for 
treatment. See id. 
25 Id.  
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The Tuskegee study lasted for forty years.26  While the men 
received only $25.00 for participating in the program, the Tuskegee 
victims received a collective settlement of ten million dollars in 
1974.27  Then, in 1997, President Bill Clinton formally apologized to 
the victims and their families for the “clearly racist” study that was 
“orchestrated” by the federal government.28  
 Despite these events, the medical community is still debating 
the topic of informed consent today.  For example, in 2009, the 
Gardasil vaccine received serious backlash regarding its efficacy and 
safety.29  One of the top researchers of Gardasil and HPV vaccinations, 
Dr. Diane Harper, came out against the drug, stating that “the benefit 
to public health is nothing, there is no reduction in cervical cancers.”30  
While Merck, the drug’s manufacturer, and the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (CDC) have stated that adequate warnings, 
such as “soreness at the injection site and risk of fainting after 
vaccination” are provided, questions remain whether more might be 
necessary.31  Further, while no link is established, girls that received 
the vaccination have had episodes of blood clots, developed Lou 
Gehrig’s Disease (ALS), and even died.32   
Before this came to light, in 2008, in the United Kingdom, 
2,000 girls were given the vaccine and developed side-effects that 
included “nausea, dizziness, blurred vision, convulsions, seizures, and 
hyperventilation [with] 4,602 suspected side-effects recorded in total 
[and] the most tragic case involv[ing] a 14-year-old girl who dropped 
dead in the corridor of her school an hour after receiving the 
vaccination.”33  However, the complete range of reported symptoms 
experienced from the vaccine was not included in the CDC’s 
warning.34  Dr. Harper stated that “[p]arents and women must know 
that deaths occurred.”35   
Further, Dr. Harper advised that the warning should be more 
complete and include “that protection from the vaccination might not 
                                                 
 
26 Id. at 25.  
27 Id. at 37, 25. 
28 Id. at 53.  
29 See, e.g., Sharyl Attkisson, Gardasil Researcher Speaks Out, CBS NEWS (Aug. 19, 
2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/gardasil-researcher-speaks-out/ (discussing 
the potential dangers and controversy regarding the vaccination).  
30 Id.   
31 Id.  
32 Id.  
33 Vera Shirav, Gardasil Vaccine Researcher Drops Bombshell, ALLIANCE FOR HUM. 
RES. PROTECTION (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.ahrp.org/cms/content/view/642/103/.  
34 Attkisson, supra note 29. 
35 Id. 
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last long enough to provide a cancer protection benefit, and that its 
risks—‘small but real’—could occur more often than the cervical 
cancer itself would.”36  Therefore, while Gardasil is still available on 
the market and encouraged for young girls and women, there are 
important details not widely known about this vaccine.  Clearly the 
notion of informed consent has made significant advancements since 
World War II, but whether informed consent has evolved far enough 
within the medical community is unclear.   
 
III. THE HISTORY OF MKULTRA  
 
Beginning in the late 1940s and continuing through the next 
three decades, the U.S. military and the CIA initiated programs to 
study human behavior.37  Many of the programs, specifically 
MKULTRA, were initiated as a retaliatory effort because of fears that 
the Soviet Union was “engaged in intensive efforts to produce LSD.”38  
The research conducted and sponsored by the CIA would give the 
agency an understanding of “the mechanisms by which these 
substance[s] worked and how their effects could be defeated.”39  
 The U.S. Navy initiated Project Chatter in 1947.40  The 
program tested the use of drugs for their utility in interrogation and 
recruitment.41  Drugs such as anabasis uphylla, scopolamine, and 
mescaline were used on humans to “determine their speech-inducing 
qualities.”42  Project Chatter was engaged throughout the Korean War, 
and it was terminated in 1953.43  
 In 1950, Project Bluebird was approved and initiated by the 
CIA.44  Bluebird had several objectives, among them “conditioning 
personnel to prevent unauthorized extraction of information,” 
controlling persons in interrogations, “memory enhancement,” and 
“preventing hostile control of Agency personnel.”45  After initiating 
                                                 
 
36 Id.  
37 Project MKULTRA, The CIA’s Program of Research in Behavior Modification: 
Joint Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Intelligence Activities & the Subcomm. on 
Health & Sci. Research, 95th Cong. 385-86 (1977), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/national/13inmate_ProjectMKULTRA.pdf. 
38 Id. at 72. 
39 Id.  
40 Id. at 67.  
41 Id.  
42 Id.  
43 Id.  
44 Id.  
45 Id.  
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the Project Bluebird, another program directive, Project Artichoke, 
was engaged to evaluate the “offensive use of unconventional 
interrogation techniques, including hypnosis and drugs.”46  Project 
Artichoke included “in-house experiments on interrogation techniques, 
conducted ‘under medical and security controls, which would ensure 
that no damage was done to individuals who volunteer[ed] for the 
experiments.’”47  
 Under Project MKNAOMI, the U.S. Army, in 1952, agreed to 
assist the CIA in “developing, testing, and maintaining biological 
agents and delivery systems.”48  The Army provided the CIA with 
darts containing “biological agents” and pills that contained “several 
different biological agents” the CIA could use to develop biological 
weapons.49  This project continued until 1970, when President Nixon 
ordered that biological weapons capable of killing or incapacitating 
could not be kept.50  
 Finally, MKULTRA was approved in 1953 to develop 
chemical and biological weapons that would be used in the future to 
“control human behavior” in “clandestine operations.”51  MKULTRA 
was classified in 1963, after the Inspector General’s survey produced 
several reasons why the project should be considered “sensitive,” 
including:  
 
(a) Research in the manipulation of human behavior is 
considered by many authorities in medicine and 
related fields to be professionally unethical, 
therefore the reputation of the professional 
participants in MKULTRA program are on occasion 
in jeopardy.  
(b) Some MKULTRA activities raise questions of 
legality implicit in the original charter.  
(c) A final phase of the testing of MKULTRA products 
places the rights and interests of U.S. citizens in 
jeopardy. 
(d) Public disclosures of some aspects of MKULTRA 
activity could induce serious adverse reaction in 
U.S. public opinion, as well as stimulate offensive 
                                                 
 
46 Id.  
47 Id. at 67-68.  
48 Id. at 68-69.  
49 Id. at 69.  
50 Id.  
51 Id. 
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and defensive action in this field on the part of 
foreign intelligence services.52   
 
MKULTRA ran from 1953 to 1964, and experimented with 
“radiation, electroshock, . . . harassment substances, and [the use of] 
paramilitary devices and materials.”53  Then CIA Director, Admiral 
Stansfield Turner, testified to Congress in 1977 that this was solely a 
CIA project; there was “no evidence within the Agency of any 
involvement at higher echelons, the White House, for instance, or 
specific approval.”54  Although the Admiral was careful to avoid 
stating that the program was purposely shielded from the President of 
the United States, he commented that the President knew nothing 
about the testing conducted on U.S. citizens and military personnel.55  
MKULTRA had three different phases of research: “first, the 
search for materials suitable for study; second, laboratory testing on 
voluntary human subjects in various types of institutions; third, the 
application of MKULTRA materials in normal life settings.”56  While 
substances to experiment with were not difficult to discover, how and 
where did the CIA find “voluntary” subjects to test the use of mind-
altering drugs?  The answer to that question, obviously, is where 
numerous people were stripped of their resolve and autonomy—
namely, hospitals and prisons.57  
The first study was initiated in the National Institute of Mental 
Health, and tested drugs and hallucinogens on patients (usually 
prisoners) at the Addiction Research Center.58  This center essentially 
became “a prison for drug addicts serving sentences for drug 
violations,” in that the CIA then subjected the drug offenders to drug 
use in order to monitor hallucinogenic effects.59  Although the 
Congressional Report states that these “test subjects were volunteer 
prisoners,” it also says that only a physical test and a general consent 
form were required before administering these mind altering drugs.60  
Were there any psychological evaluations?  Was history of prior 
substance abuse taken into account?  Did it matter how long a prisoner 
                                                 
 
52 Id. at 70. 
53 Id. at 4, 70. 
54 Id. at 13.  
55 Id. at 13-14.  
56 Id. at 70.  
57 Id. at 71.  
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
60 Id.  
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had been drug-free before asking them to “volunteer” to be fed 
government drugs?  
The CIA did not seem particularly troubled with these 
questions, and eventually admitted to using LSD in “surreptitious 
administration of unwitting nonvolunteer subjects in normal life 
settings.”61  The CIA began this program to research the “full pattern 
of reaction” on various test subjects, including “individuals at all 
social levels, high and low, Native American and foreign.”62  The 
information gathered from MKULTRA was used for “harassment, 
discrediting, or disabling persons” in interrogation settings.63 
However, not only did the CIA discover an interest in the 
effects of LSD, the U.S. Army began its own experimentations.64 The 
Army tested LSD on three different groups of soldiers:  
 
In the first [group], LSD was administered to more than 
1,000 American soldiers who volunteered to be subjects 
in chemical warfare experiments.  In the second phase . 
. . 95 volunteers received LSD in clinical experiments 
designed to evaluate potential intelligence uses of the 
drug. In the third phase, . . . 16 unwitting nonvolunteer 
subjects were interrogated after receiving LSD as part 
of operational field tests.65 
 
It appeared MKULTRA’s experimentation knew no bounds, 
and in the 1977 Congressional Hearing, Admiral Turner testified on 
the known extent of the program.66  Despite widespread document 
destruction after the program ended, Admiral Turner claimed he was 
working closely with the Attorney General to identify the individuals 
used as unwitting test subjects, since names were not recorded.67  
However, when asked whether he could provide a list of all individuals 
involved and whether they were voluntary or involuntarily subjects, 
Admiral Turner responded that he could.68  He does not, however, 
explain how he could provide such a list without knowledge of their 
identity.69  Senator Kennedy posed the next question to the Admiral: 
                                                 
 
61 Id.  
62 Id. (citation omitted).  
63 Id.  
64 Id. at 11, 72. 
65 Id. at 72.  
66 Id. at 4-5. 
67 Id. at 86.  
68 Id. at 36. 
69 Id.  
182    Tennessee Journal of Race, Gender, & Social Justice    [Vol. 3:2 
 
“It is your intention to notify the individuals who have been the 
subjects of the research . . . ?”70  The Admiral simply answered yes, so 
Senator Kennedy pushed further stating, “If you can identify them, you 
intend to notify them.”71  The Admiral agreed.72 
Senator Kennedy then asked whether the Admiral could 
identify all universities and research centers that were involved; again, 
the Admiral answered in the affirmative.73  While Senator Kennedy 
wanted these institutions named, the Admiral stated policy reasons for 
non-disclosure, including the facilities’ reputations.74  However, the 
Admiral stated that he “already notified one institution because the 
involvement was so extensive that I thought they really needed to 
protect themselves . . . .”75  
Although the Admiral provided no additional information on 
the identity of the university, it came to light that the University of 
Maryland President, Wilson H. Elkins, received a letter from the 
Department of the Army, dated October 14, 1975, two years prior to 
the Congressional Hearing.76  The letter sought information regarding 
any follow-up studies that the university had conducted on its own, 
and whether it could provide information on individual test subjects 
and members of the university involved.77  President Elkin’s response 
stated that “the contract with the Army Medical Research and 
Development Command and the University of Maryland stipulated 
that the studies were Secret, so that all records were either turned over 
the Army or destroyed.”78  However, Elkins provided three names of 
personnel at the University of Maryland who were involved.79  Indeed, 
one such faculty member, Walter Weintraub, the Director of Graduate 
Education for the Department of Psychiatry at the University of 
Maryland School of Medicine, wrote numerous articles regarding drug 
                                                 
 
70 Id.  
71 Id.  
72 Id.  
73 Id.  
74 Id.  
75 Id. at 37.  
76 Letter from Dr. Kenneth R. Dirks, Brigadier Gen., U.S. Army Med. Research & 
Dev. Command, to Wilson H. Elkins, President, Univ. of Md. (Oct. 14, 1975) (on 
file with author).  
77 Id.  
78 Letter from Wilson H. Elkins, President, Univ. of Md., to Dr. Kenneth R. Dirks, 
Brigadier Gen., U.S. Army Med. Research & Dev. Command (Dec. 23, 1975) (on 
file with author). 
79 Id.  
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use and testing.80  Regarding follow-up studies, Elkins commented: 
“The institution, of course has no authority to conduct follow-up 
studies on military personnel, and there is no record of civilian studies 
so that we are not considering conducting such a follow-up.”81  
Strangely enough, around the same time as this Congressional 
Hearing, the University of Maryland received another communication, 
this time from the CIA itself.82  In a Board of Regents meeting, 
President Elkins noted that the CIA accused the university of 
providing money to conduct MKULTRA research.83  However, Elkins 
stated that, although the CIA may have record of a $3,750 grant in 
1956 for “study of the effect of blood vessels of certain camphoric acid 
derivatives,” the university received the grant from “a private 
organization.”84  Elkins stated that the “University had no indication 
[the] CIA was the source of the funds,” and that the “University had no 
other direct or indirect involvement with Project MKULTRA.”85  
However, the University of Maryland has yet to find this 1977 letter 
about MKULTRA funding from the CIA.86  Indeed, the only record of 
the letter is Elkin’s reference to it in the Board of Regents meeting.87  
Other documents relating to MKULTRA have been slowly 
released by the CIA, one page at a time.  In 1998, the CIA’s Office of 
General Counsel released a letter (with names redacted), dated October 
3, 1977, which was addressed to the California Medical Facility.88  
The letter included documents to address the extent of the facility’s 
involvement and stated:  
 
                                                 
 
80 Id.  See generally Walter Weintraub, The Clinical Use and Misuse of 
Tranquilizers, 3 MD. ST. MED. J. (1962); Walter Weintraub & H. Aronson, Clinical 
Judgment in Psychopharmacological Research, 5 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY 65-70 
(1963); Walter Weintraub et al., The Influence of Varying Dosage on the Effects of 
Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD-25) in Humans, 132 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL 
DISEASE 404 (1961).  As evidenced above, Weintraub’s articles indicate his 
involvement in the LSD study. 
81 See Letter from Elkins, supra note 78.  
82 Wilson H. Elkins, President, Univ. of Md., Remarks at the Board of Regents 
Special Meeting (Aug. 19, 1977) (on file with author). 
83 Id. 
84 Id.  
85 Id.  
86 Email from Archivist, Univ. of Md., to Brandy Disbennett (Nov. 6, 2013) (on file 
with author).  
87 Id.  
88 Letter from Cent. Intelligence Agency, Office of Gen. Counsel, to Dr. T.L. 
Clanon, Cal. Med. Facility (Oct. 3, 1977), available at 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000
196947.pdf.  
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These materials are in the same form in which they 
have been made available to the public except that, in 
order to allow you to judge the nature and extent of the 
Facility’s involvement, the name of the Facility and 
SIMPR have been reinserted wherever they appear in 
the original documents.89  
 
Then, in 2002, the CIA released an account of funds to 
institutions regarding the projects and budgets.90  The latest release, 
from 2006, is an office memorandum labeled “Notes for DDCI” 
(Deputy Director of Central Intelligence), dated August 3, 1964.91  The 
drafting party has been redacted and includes three points, but only the 
last is pertinent:  
 
We are holding the papers for your session with the 
Director, et. al, today on MKSEARCH, the program for 
testing exotic drugs on unwitting Americans.  A pre-
session with Helms, Gottlieb, and Earman is tentatively 
scheduled for 2:00 today for a meeting with the DCI at 
2:30.  Since the DCI has a 1:00 lunch appointment with 
the President, this may all slip, but I will keep track of it 
today.92  
 
Beside the typed text, a handwritten note reads “extremely, 
frightfully, and frantically sensitive.”93  This note is most compelling 
because Admiral Turner testified that he had no reason to believe the 
President had knowledge of the programs, though this memorandum 
suggests the Commander-in-Chief may have known exactly what was 
occurring.94  
                                                 
 
89 Id.  The letter subsequently states: “The information which remains deleted 
includes the names of all other institutions and organizations, all individuals, and 
CIA employees, except those who have been publicly acknowledged by the Agency 
at some prior time.” 
90 Memorandum from Cent. Intelligence Agency on Project MKULTRA (Dec. 5, 
1956), available at 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000
707674.pdf.  
91 Memorandum for Deputy Dir. of Cent. Intelligence (Aug. 3, 1964), available at 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/5829/CIA-
RDP80B01676R001300100015-3.pdf. 
92 Id.  
93 Id.  Though difficult to read in the original, the last word appears to be “sensitive.” 
94 Project MKULTRA, supra note 37, at 13-14.  Here, again, the Admiral states that 
he has been assured “there is no evidence within the Agency of any involvement at 
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IV.  A CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM  
 
 Knowing that MKULTRA existed and was used as an 
experimental drug program on unwitting Americans, the question 
becomes, what can that soldier do now?  While a well-established rule 
would grant a lay citizen relief for a violation of the United States 
Constitution, such as an unreasonable search and seizure, this rule does 
not apply to service members with a claim against their superior 
officers during active duty.95  For reasons discussed in the following 
cases, the Supreme Court has not found it appropriate to extend a 
remedy to veterans whose constitutionally protected rights were 
violated while in the service.  
First, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics, the Court held that a violation of the Constitution 
by a government actor gives rise to damages for an individual.96  The 
Court relied heavily on Bell v. Hood, and stated that “where federally 
protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the 
beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to 
grant the necessary relief.”97  
Articulating the “special factors” test, the Court found there 
were “no special factors counselling hesitation in the absence of 
affirmative action by Congress.”98  The Court implied that, without 
congressional intent to create a remedy, a court should not create a 
remedy on its own.99  For example, the Court referenced United States 
v. Standard Oil, where the Court found that the case involved “federal 
fiscal policy,” and, therefore, Congress should create the remedy, not 
the courts.100  
                                                                                                                   
 
higher echelons, the White House, for instance, or specific approval.”  Also note that 
MKSEARCH was a follow-up program to MKULTRA.  
95 See Bivens v. Several Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 
403 U.S. 388, 389, 396 (1971) (holding that the violation of a constitutional right by 
a federal agent acting under his authority gives rise to an action for damages from the 
constitutional violation, but that the doctrine may not be extended when “special 
factors” apply).  But see United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 671 (1987) (finding 
that a Bivens claim is not permitted when a service member’s injury stems from an 
action that is “incident to service”); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298, 304 
(1983) (holding that “special factors” prevent service members from seeking 
damages for a Bivens claim). 
96 See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389. 
97 Id. at 392 (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S 678, 684 (1946)).  
98 Id. at 396.  
99 Id. at 396-97. 
100 Id. at 396 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 311 (1947)).  
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Twelve years after Bivens, the Court in Chappell v. Wallace 
held that service members may not recover damages for constitutional 
violations arising while in-service, a Bivens-type claim.101 Due to the 
“peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors” and 
“inescapable demands” in the military that call for “immediate 
compliance with military procedures and orders [that] must be 
virtually reflex,” the Court found it appropriate to deny the petitioner’s 
claim.102 
Further, in analyzing the Bivens special factors test, the Court 
found that a congressionally created remedy existed and should be 
utilized.103  Congress created the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ) for service members to “avail themselves of the procedures 
and remedies created by Congress.”104  The Court indicated the 
petitioners should have sought redress in the UCMJ instead of within 
the court system, and this conclusion would also support the Court’s 
finding that “special factors” prohibited this claim.105  Due to the 
creation of the UCMJ, the Court decided there can be no remedy for a 
service member bringing claims of constitutional violations against 
their superior officers.106  
 The doctrines of Bivens and Chappell intersected once again 
when U.S. Army Master Sergeant James B. Stanley filed a complaint 
alleging unwitting exposure to lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD) while 
in the service.107  In February of 1958, Master Sergeant Stanley 
participated in a program that was “designed to test the effectiveness 
of protective clothing and equipment as defenses against chemical 
warfare.”108  However, during this program, Stanley was given, 
unbeknownst to him, doses of LSD.109  The Army’s purpose in 
secretly dosing volunteers was “to study the effects of the drug on 
human subjects.”110  
Stanley was not aware of the LSD testing until December 10, 
1975, when the Army sent him a letter, inquiring about the long-term 
effects of LSD on the “volunteers” in the 1958 study.111  Stanley 
                                                 
 
101 Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 (1983).  
102 Id. at 300 (quoting United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954)). 
103 Id. at 299.  Note that the Court here applied a Feres analysis due to pertinent 
policy concerns.  Id. at 299-304. 
104 Id. at 302.  
105 See id. at 303.  
106 Id. at 304.  
107 United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 671 (1987).  
108 Id.   
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
111 Id.  
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brought suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act, “alleging negligence 
in the administration, supervision, and subsequent monitoring of the 
drug testing program.”112  
Stanley contended that the LSD caused him to experience 
“hallucinations,” “incoherence,” “memory loss,” and “impaired . . . 
military performance,” along with periods of violence towards his 
family.113  He reported that, on occasion, he would “awake from sleep 
at night and, without reason, violently beat his wife and children, later 
being unable to recall the entire incident.”114  After Stanley was 
discharged in 1969, he and his wife divorced, due to “personality 
changes wrought by the LSD.”115  
 Chappell was issued during the time Stanley was still fighting 
to appear in district court.116 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Stanley because the Circuits Courts had inconsistently applied 
Chappell against Bivens-type claims, and there was no clear guidance 
for courts on whether Chappell served as a direct bar to Bivens 
actions.117  
 Stanley attempted to distinguish his case from Chappell 
through two distinct arguments.118  First, Stanley argued that his injury 
was in no way “incident to service.”119  Justice Scalia, writing for the 
majority, stated that “[i]f that argument is sound, then even if Feres 
principles apply fully to Bivens actions, further proceedings are 
necessary to determine whether they apply to this case.”120  Stanley 
also argued that the individuals who gave him LSD were not his 
superior officers and “may well have been civilian personnel.”121  
Because of this, the Court admitted Chappell is “not strictly 
controlling.”122  Unlike the civilian military scientists in Stanley, 
Chappell’s case involved superior officers, and policy concerns 
supported denying the claim against superior officers because they 
should be able to make decisions quickly.123  Here, however, the 
                                                 
 
112 Id. at 672; see also Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (2014).  
Note that the effect of the Feres doctrine barred the claim because Stanley was on 
active duty at the time of the alleged negligence.  Stanley, 483 U.S. at 672. 
113 Stanley, 483 U.S. at 671. 
114 Id.  
115 Id.  
116 Id. at 674.  
117 Id. at 676.  
118 Id. at 679-80.  
119 Id. at 680. 
120 Id.   
121 Id. at 679.  
122 Id. at 680. 
123 Id.  
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policy concerns of Chappell do not support Stanley’s claim because 
the conduct may not have been performed by military personnel.124  
 Nevertheless, the Court did not find that Stanley’s assertions 
distinguished the case from Chappell’s other policy concerns.125  The 
Constitution imbued Congress with such articulated powers, and 
where military concerns are involved, the Court will not extend a 
remedy in a situation absent Congressional action.126  Further, Justice 
Scalia stated that the creation of a remedy by the court system, in spite 
of Congress, would be “inappropriate.”127  Ultimately, the Court 
reaffirmed Chappell and the use of the special factors test.128 
 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor concurred in part and dissented 
in part to the majority decision.129  She asserted that the holdings in 
Chappell and Feres should be “read together” as “both cases 
unmistakably stand for the proposition that the special circumstances 
of the military mandate that civilian courts avoid entertaining a suit 
involving harm caused as a result of military service.”130  In reading 
the cases together, a claim brought by a service member, having arisen 
out of even “negligence, recklessness, [or] deliberate indifference” by 
the military would not survive a Bivens-type analysis.131  However, 
Justice O’Connor continued, stating that Chappell is applicable only to 
harms that “arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to 
service.”132  In Stanley’s case, however, Justice O’Connor believed 
that this harm was not incident to service, stating, “In my view, 
conduct of the type alleged in this case is so far beyond the bounds of 
human decency that as a matter of law it simply cannot be considered 
a part of the military mission.”133  She would, therefore, have granted 
Stanley’s claim the ability to be heard in court under a Bivens analysis, 
stating that “[n]o judicially crafted rule should insulate from liability 
the involuntary and unknowing human experimentation alleged.”134 
Nonetheless, Stanley’s day in court remained denied.  
 
 
 
                                                 
 
124 Id.  
125 Id. at 705. 
126 Id. at 682.  
127 Id. at 683.  
128 Id.  
129 Id. at 708.  
130 Id. at 709.  
131 Id.  
132 Id. (quoting Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950)). 
133 Id.  
134 Id. at 709-10. 
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A.  MKULTRA in Court Today 
 
If another MKULTRA victim brought a claim in court today, 
the resolution undoubtedly would be similar to Stanley.  Thus, Stanley 
and other similarly situated veterans cannot bring a claim against the 
federal government for constitutional violations.  Even when Stanley 
attempted to distinguish himself in pivotal ways from Chappell, 
including that the conduct alleged was not by his superior officers, the 
Court nonetheless found that unwittingly dosing service members with 
LSD was incident to service and, therefore, Chappell and Feres barred 
Stanley’s claim. 
Despite grave violations of constitutionally protected rights, the 
United States Supreme Court decided that veterans may not receive a 
judicial remedy because it would be contrary to congressional intent.  
But the ultimate effect of the Supreme Court’s decision is the same as 
stating that Congress would deny due process of the law to veterans.  
Even further, Congress expected that veterans who were unknowingly 
dosed with LSD in service should avail themselves of congressionally 
created remedies, such as the UCMJ. 
How far must the factual scenario go to demonstrate that 
human experimentation is not part of the military mission and, 
therefore, not incident to service?  Would it have been enough if 
Stanley knew, without a doubt, that civilians had given him LSD 
without his knowledge?  Does it matter that Stanley did not learn of 
his harm until after he was discharged from the Army?  What can an 
individual do without proof?  
  
V.  THE FERES DOCTRINE 
 
Feres v. United States is a landmark decision in the history of 
the Supreme Court.  It created the Feres Doctrine, which is the main 
hurdle for service members and veterans recovering in a tort action 
against the armed forces and their superior officers.  The Court in 
Feres looked at three different factual scenarios: the “Feres case,” the 
“Jefferson case,” and the “Griggs case.”135 
In the Feres case, a soldier was in his barracks when it caught 
fire and killed him.136  His estate alleged that the military was 
negligent in quartering the service member there when it knew, or 
should have known, that the barracks were “unsafe because of a 
                                                 
 
135 Feres, 340 U.S. at 136-37.  
136 Id. at 137.  
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defective heating plant.”137  The Jefferson case involved a service 
member who underwent an abdominal surgery and, eight months later, 
“a towel 30 inches long by 18 inches wide, marked ‘Medical 
Department U.S. Army’” was extracted from his stomach.138  Finally, 
the Griggs case dealt with issues of negligence and “unskillful medical 
treatment” that caused the service member’s death.139  The Court 
articulated the common underlying theme in all three cases: the 
plaintiffs were on active duty and “sustained injury due to negligence 
of others in the armed forces.”140  
The Court examined whether the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA)141 provided legal recourse to a service member who sustained 
a harm due to negligence on behalf of the armed forces when the harm 
was acquired “incident to the service.”142  First, the FTCA excludes 
recovery from “[a]ny claim arising out of the combatant activities of 
the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during time of 
war.”143  The Court then discussed several arguments as to why the 
FTCA must also bar service members’ negligence claims.144 
The Court in Feres determined that there were a number of 
inequalities that would arise, should a service member be able to sue 
the armed forces.145  Notably, noting the fact that a soldier is not able 
to choose his station, the Court paints a picture that a veteran could be 
a victim of tort law because he is forced to reside in a particular state 
or territory, and this is inherently unfair.146  
The Court also relied on the special connection between a 
soldier and his command, as a distinct federal relationship between 
service members and the government that is “derived from federal 
sources and governed by federal authority.”147  The Court commented 
that the FTCA is a congressional exercise of power and it is intended 
to fit into the scope of other remedies, such as “systems of simple, 
                                                 
 
137 Id.  
138 Id.  
139 Id.  
140 Id. at 138.  
141 Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (2014).  The FTCA 
authorizes civil tort suits to be brought against the United States.  See H.R. 2249, 
110th Cong. (2007). 
142 Feres, 340 U.S. at 138.  
143 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j)). 
144 Id. at 139. 
145 Id.at 142-43. 
146 Id.  
147 Id. at 144.  
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certain, and uniform compensation for injuries or death of those in 
armed services.”148  
The Court looked to the Department of Veterans Affairs and its 
disability compensation system as the appropriate remedy, stating the 
VA system “normally requires no litigation [and] is not negligible or 
niggardly . . . .”149  The Court also articulated that “a soldier is at 
peculiar disadvantage in litigation,” in that the “[l]ack of time and 
money” and “difficulty if not impossibility of procuring witnesses” 
would severely affect the soldier’s ability to defend himself in tort 
litigation.150 
The important question then is whether Feres is still modern in 
its policy concerns.  The VA system that is intended to provide a 
veteran with a fair and equitable remedy is no longer an efficient 
system.151  Further, the information gathering for a disability 
compensation claim is similar to that which a veteran would have to 
show in a court environment.152 
 Feres should not bar claims brought by veterans concerning 
involuntary ingestion of LSD due to the nature of CIA-initiated human 
experimentation programs.  In a 1994 report prepared for the 
Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, contributors expressed why Feres 
should not apply to MKULTRA victims, stating, “[W]hen 
inappropriate experimentation has resulted in suffering for military 
personnel, [the Feres doctrine] stands in violation of established 
ethical standards . . . .”153  The report further asserted that “Congress 
should not apply the Feres Doctrine for military personnel who are 
harmed by inappropriate experimentation when informed consent has 
not been given.”154  It cited Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Stanley to 
support its assertion.155  Justice O’Connor postured that a MKULTRA 
victim should not be denied a remedy due to the government’s 
“deliberate and calculated exposure of otherwise healthy military 
                                                 
 
148 Id.  
149 Id. at 145.  
150 Id.  
151 See generally JACQUELINE MAFFUCCI, THE BATTLE TO END THE VA BACKLOG 
(2014), available at 
http://media.iava.org/2014BattleToEndtheVABacklog_PRINT.pdf (discussing the 
VA backlog that inhibits access to benefits for veterans). 
152 Id. at 12-13 (describing the difficulties in collecting evidence for a claim). 
153 STAFF OF S. COMM. ON VETERANS AFFAIRS, 103D CONG., IS MILITARY RESEARCH 
HAZARDOUS TO VETERANS’ HEALTH? LESSONS SPANNING HALF A CENTURY 45 
(Comm. Print 1994). 
154 Id.    
155 Id.  
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personnel to medical experimentation without their consent, outside of 
any combat, combat training, or military exigency . . . .”156  
 The Feres decision relied on the fact that soldiers suffered their 
harm “in the course of activity incident to service.”157  However, the 
activities of MKULTRA did not involve service members performing 
in the course of duty, and, therefore, their harm could not have 
occurred incident to service, especially where the participants did not 
give informed consent.  Further, as Justice O’Connor wrote in her 
Stanley dissent, MKULTRA was never in line with a military 
mission.158  Even during the course of the program, its validity and 
legality were continuously questioned,159 and the leaders of the 
programs ordered frequent document destruction.160  These actions 
should not be understood to be in the line of duty, in line with the 
military mission, or in any other formulation that would excuse a claim 
because of the Feres Doctrine’s attention to the “federal sources . . . 
governed by federal authority.”161 
  
VI.  DISABILITY COMPENSATION SYSTEM 
 
While the disability compensation system may have been 
efficient in the 1950s, it has been severely criticized recently for its 
inability to adapt and change its technological deficiencies, its 
                                                 
 
156 Id. (citing United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 709 (1987) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting)). 
157 Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950).  
158 See Stanley, 483 U.S. at 708-10 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
159 Project MKULTRA, supra note 37, at 398.  The General Counsel wrote to the 
Inspector General after the suicide of an unwitting victim of LSD: “I’m not happy 
with what seems to be a very casual attitude on the part of . . . representatives to the 
way this experiment was conducted . . . . I do believe, especially when human health 
or life is at stake, that at least the prudent, reasonable measures which can be taken to 
minimize the risk must be taken and failure to do so was culpable negligence.” 
160 See id. at 403-04.  Dr. Sidney Gottlieb spoke with the Director of Central 
Intelligence, Richard Helms upon his retirement, and Gottlieb believed that “it would 
be a good idea if these files were destroyed.”  Id. at 403.  Helms further remarked 
that “we thought we would just get rid of the files as well, so that anybody who 
assisted us in the past would not be subject to follow-up or questions, 
embarrassment, if you will.”  Id. at 403-04.  Further, the Select Committee found that 
even prior to this document destruction by Helms and Gottlieb, “MKULTRA records 
were far from complete” and the Inspector General stated in 1963 that “MKULTRA 
record[s] appear . . . to rest in the memories of the principal officers and is therefore 
almost certain to be lost with their departures.”  Id. at 404 n.7.   
161 Feres, 340 U.S. at 144; see also Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-
2680 (2014).  Since even an intentional tort claim would be barred by the FTCA, it is 
a moot point whether the actions by the CIA and U.S. Army were negligence or 
battery.  28 U.S.C. § 2680(j) (2013). 
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inaccuracy in claims processing, and its huge backlog and delay in 
addressing claims.162  Currently, there are nearly 250,000 claims more 
than 125 days old pending at regional Veterans Affairs offices.163  This 
number includes claims for original entitlement and for increased 
rating evaluation.164  Although the backlog has decreased since 2013, 
the overall number of claims has increased and the VA system is still 
overburdened by the sheer volume.165  Further, the majority of claims 
that are processed require adjudication, and because of the VA’s effort 
to reduce backlog, the number of claims in the appeals process has 
increased.166  Indeed, appeals have grown by nearly 17%.167  As of 
September 2014, over 260,000 claims were currently in the first stages 
of the appeals process, and the Court of Appeals for Veteran’s Claims 
heard and decided more than 3,800 appeals in 2013.168  
In order to be successful in a claim for service-connected 
disability, a veteran must show:  (1) medical evidence of a current 
diagnosed physical or mental disability; (2) evidence of an event, 
injury, or disease in service; and (3) a link between his current 
disability and the event, injury or disease in service, usually supported 
by medical evidence.169  
While the VA does have a statutory duty to assist veterans in 
obtaining necessary evidence,170 the burden initially falls on the 
veteran to collect and identify the following: (1) information from his 
service record as to an in service injury; (2) current medical 
                                                 
 
162 See MAFFUCCI, supra note 151, at 3-4. 
163 2014 Performance and Accountability Report Part I, DEP’T. OF VETERAN AFF., 
Nov. 17, 2014, at 2, available at http://www.va.gov/budget/docs/report/2014-
VAparPartI.pdf. 
164 2014 Performance and Accountability Report Part II, DEP’T. OF VETERAN AFF., 
Nov. 17, 2014, at 3, available at http://www.va.gov/budget/docs/report/2014-
VAparPartII.pdf. 
165 Id. (discussing the various challenges faced by the VA, including the increased 
complexity of claims).    
166 Id. at 97.  
167 Id. at 3.  
168 Id. at 98; Performance and Accountability Report, U.S. CT. OF APPEALS FOR 
VETERANS CLAIMS (2013), at 3, available at 
http://www.uscourts.cavc.gov/documents/FY2013PerformanceAccountabilityReport.
pdf.   
169  See Claims and Evidence: FDC Checklist for Disability Compensation, DEP’T OF 
VETERANS AFF., http://www.benefits.va.gov/fdc/checklist.asp (last visited Feb. 16, 
2014); see also 38 C.F.R. § 3.303(a) (2013) (“Service connection connotes many 
factors but basically it means that the facts, shown by evidence, establish that a 
particular injury or disease resulting in disability was incurred coincident with 
service in the armed forces, or if preexisting such service, was aggravated therein.”).  
170 See 38 U.S.C. § 5103A (2013) (stating that the VA has a duty to assist claimants 
in obtaining evidence); 38 C.F.R. § 21.1032 (2013). 
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documentation that denotes an injury in-service; and (3) current 
documents that correlate the two conditions (for example, a letter from 
a doctor reconciling the veteran’s in-service injury and the current 
condition).171  In proving their claims, combat veterans frequently 
resort to buddy statements to prove the occurrence of events or verify 
an in-service stressor.172  
 An MKULTRA victim will likely meet only one of the 
necessary burdens.  For example, he or she may have proof of their 
participation in the program, such as a letter similar to the one Stanley 
received.  Or, he or she may have a current diagnosed condition, such 
as chronic paranoia or anxiety.  However, they would need both, 
simultaneously, to proceed.  Moreover, he or she would need a doctor 
willing to write a statement verifying that their condition was caused 
by LSD exposure sometime during the 1950s and 1960s.  
 But assume a particular victim can meet all of the burdens—
that they have a current diagnosed condition, that their doctor has 
reviewed their military records and treatment history and is willing to 
write a letter stating their belief that the veteran’s condition is likely 
related to LSD exposure in the service.  Then, how will this particular 
veteran also prove that they were, in fact, given LSD unwittingly?  
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
recently decided a case from the Court of Appeals for Veterans’ 
Claims that related to the burden of proof in VA claims.173  AZ v. 
Shinseki involved a service-connection claim for Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD) as a result of sexual assault that occurred in-
service.174  However, prior adjudication denied the appellant’s claim 
because her military service records did not contain treatment records 
of a sexual assault.175  According to 38 U.S.C. § 5107:  
 
                                                 
 
171 See Shedden v. Principi, 381 F.3d 1163, 1166-67 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  A veteran 
must show: “(1) the existence of a present disability; (2) in-service incurrence or 
aggravation of a disease or injury; and (3) a causal relationship between the present 
disability and the disease or injury incurred or aggravated during service.”  Id. (citing 
Hansen v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 110, 111 (Vet. App. 2002)).  
172 See Special Rules for Combat Veterans Proving “In Service Occurrence or 
Aggravation of a Disease or Injury,” AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, at 2, available 
at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/young_lawyers/project_
salute/cb_d2_f26_special_rules_for_combat_veterans_proving_in_service_occurren
ce_or_aggravation_of_a_disease_or_injury.authcheckdam.pdf.  
173 See AZ v. Shinseki, 731 F.3d 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2013).  
174 Id.  
175 Id. at 1305-06.  
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The Secretary shall consider all information and lay and 
medical evidence of record in a case before the 
Secretary with respect to benefits under laws 
administered by the Secretary.  When there is an 
approximate balance of positive and negative evidence 
regarding any issue material to the determination of a 
matter, the Secretary shall give the benefit of the doubt 
to the claimant.176  
 
 However, AZ is not about the appellant having documented 
evidence weighed against her; rather, it is about having the lack of 
evidence weighed against her.177  While the statute addresses the 
weight of positive and negative evidence, it does not address the 
weight of an absence of evidence.178  The court explained that “[t]he 
absence of certain evidence may be pertinent if it tends to disprove (or 
prove) a material fact.”179  However, in exploring the facts before it, 
the court found that “servicemen and servicewomen who experience 
in-service sexual assaults face ‘unique’ disincentives to report.”180  For 
example, servicewomen failed to report sexual assault because of “fear 
of retaliation or reprisals,” fear of the stigma associated with reporting, 
or fear they would “appear weak or incapable of performing their 
mission.”181  The court also cited to a 2010 report from the Sexual 
Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO) that reviewed the 
last six years of reporting and found that less than 15% of service 
members who were victims of sexual assault reported the event to the 
military.182  
Thus, the question before the court in AZ was whether the VA 
could recognize a service connection for the other 85% of service 
members who did not report their sexual assault due to fear.183  The 
Federal Circuit reviewed, in depth, the common law rules of evidence 
                                                 
 
176 Id. at 1310 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (2013)).  
177 Id. at 1311. 
178 Id.; see also 38 U.S.C. § 5107(b) (2013). 
179 AZ, 731 F.3d at 1311. 
180 Id. at 1313.  
181 Id. (citing Sexual Assault Prevention & Response Report, U.S. DEP’T. OF DEF. 
(2010), at 20, available at 
http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/DoD_Fiscal_Year_2010_Annual_Report_o
n_Sexual_Assault_in_the_Military.pdf).  
182 Id. at 1314 (citing Sexual Assault Prevention & Response Report, U.S. DEP’T. OF 
DEF. (2010), at 53, available at 
http://www.sapr.mil/public/docs/reports/DoD_Fiscal_Year_2010_Annual_Report_o
n_Sexual_Assault_in_the_Military.pdf). 
183 See id. at 1311, 1315. 
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and the Federal Rules of Evidence, and answered the question in the 
affirmative.184  The court held that the VA can grant service 
connection for those victims that did not report.185 
Where no such record would have existed, the common law 
rules of evidence would admit the absence thereof as evidence that the 
transaction did not occur, if the record is one that “naturally would 
have been made if the transaction had occurred.”186  This common law 
rule of evidence has been widely adopted by lower courts.187  It then 
became an exception to the Federal Rules of Evidence’s hearsay rules, 
specifically Rule 803(7) and Rule 803(10).188  The court stated that 
“both rules require for admissibility that ‘a record was regularly kept’ 
for the type of event in question.”189  Also, “[e]vidence that an entry is 
missing from a deficient record is inadmissible” under the Federal 
Rules of Evidence.190  
 However, referring to Buczynski v. Shinseki, the Federal Circuit 
found that “the Board [of Veterans Appeals] may not consider the 
absence of [administrative record] evidence as substantive negative 
evidence” against a claim.191  Further, consistent with its holding in 
Fagan v. Shinseki, the Federal Circuit concluded evidence that does 
not lend positive or negative support to a veteran’s claim for service-
connection is not “pertinent evidence” as to the veteran’s claim.192  In 
AZ, the court found that not reporting a sexual assault, due to the 
nature of the crime, cannot be regarded as evidence that the assault did 
not occur.193  
 Policy concerns also support the holding in AZ.  For example, 
the court discussed that the veteran’s benefits system should be based 
on “solicitude for the claimant.”194  Congress “relaxed evidentiary 
requirements” for veterans in the VA system, so to “penalize” a victim 
of sexual assault for not reporting to their superior officer “would 
                                                 
 
184 See id. at 1315-17. 
185 Id. at 1322. 
186 Id. at 1315 (citing 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON 
LAW § 1531, at 463).  
187 See id. at 1315-16.  
188 Id.  
189 Id. at 1317.  
190 Id.  
191 Id. at 1317 (quoting Buczynski v. Shinseki, 24 Vet. App. 221, 224 (Vet. App. 
2011)). 
192 Id. at 1318 (citing Fagan v. Shinseki, 573 F.3d 1282, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2009)). 
193 Id.  
194 Id. at 1322 (citing Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 
311 (1985)). 
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hardly comport with a system in which ‘the importance of systemic 
fairness and the appearance of fairness carries great weight.’”195 
 
A.  The Expansive Effect of AZ v. Shinseki 
 
The Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (CAVC) has 
embraced the Federal Circuit’s decision in AZ and has given the 
holding effect in cases beyond sexual assault.  In Helm v. Shinseki, the 
veteran, Helm, was seeking service-connection for hearing loss as a 
result of noise trauma during service.196  The VA denied the claim due 
to lack of records documenting the hearing loss.197  Specifically, 
Helm’s statements of complaints of hearing loss were “not credible 
based on the lack of objective medical evidence of hearing loss or 
tinnitus until many years after service.”198  
The court relied on two cases to reverse the Board of Veterans 
Appeal’s denial.  First, citing Horn v. Shinseki, the CAVC held that the 
“absence of evidence cannot be substantive negative evidence,” unless 
a veteran first shows a proper foundation that would show that the lack 
of record “has a tendency to prove or disprove a relevant fact.”199  
Next, referring to AZ, the court noted that “absence of documentation 
of a claimed sexual assault in service cannot be considered as evidence 
that the assault did not occur . . . .”200  Therefore, the court in Helm, 
relying on these two cases, found that the Board improperly held that 
the lack of evidence in his medical records weighed negatively against 
his claim.201  The CAVC remanded Helm’s claim for reconsideration 
by the Board.202 
 
 
                                                 
 
195 Id. (citing Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
196 Helm v. Shinseki, No. 12-2177, 2013 WL 5874707, at *1-2 (Vet. App. Oct. 31, 
2013). 
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202 Id. at *12; see also Lee v. Shinseki, No. 12-3273, 2013 WL 6816705, at *20 (Vet. 
App. Dec. 26, 2013) (holding that the Board may not make an adverse credibility 
determination on a veteran’s claim if he failed to file for an existing disability when 
that veteran had previously filed for a separate disability).  Also note that this was a 
service-connection claim for hypertension, and that the court relied on AZ, Fagan, 
Horn and Buczynski in determining that the veteran’s failure to file for hypertension 
in his claim was “too ambiguous to have probative value” and required an 
explanation of reasons and basis by the Board prior to making a credibility 
determination.  Id. at *17-18.  
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B.  AZ v. Shinseki and MKULTRA Victims 
 
 An MKULTRA victim should be permitted by the VA to avail 
themselves of AZ, its authorities, and subsequent cases because they 
are analogous scenarios: a veteran with an injury due to LSD 
experimentation, but without proof, is much like a veteran who lacks 
evidence of his or her sexual assault. 
The first hurdle for MKULTRA victims is proving when, 
where, and how they were unwittingly dosed with LSD.  
Unfortunately, whether documents exist that could illuminate a 
particular veteran’s claim, such as the list of names alluded to in the 
Congressional Hearing with Admiral Turner, is unclear.203  
 There is no exact precedent to show what the Court has done, 
or would do, in this situation, but there are some analogies we can 
draw based on other factual scenarios.  In Boggs v. West, the veteran 
alleged harm not from his time in-service, but rather as a result of VA 
treatment.204  In 1966, he was admitted to a VA hospital due to 
“reactive depression with severe anxiety, mild hysterical features, and 
excessive use of denial.”205  One year later, the veteran “consented to 
participation in an investigational study of the use of the drug LSD.”206  
Two years later, the veteran was given a follow-up examination and 
was diagnosed with “chronic severe anxiety reaction.”207  While the 
veteran stated he did not want to continue the program after one dose, 
he alleged that VA physicians continued to administer doses of LSD 
without his consent.208  His doctors supported the conclusion that his 
later diagnosis of organic brain syndrome in 1981 was indicative of 
“post-LSD syndrome,” but the VA nonetheless denied the claim.209  
The CAVC asserted that pre-existing conditions and alcoholism 
contributed to his condition, not LSD.210  The CAVC also found it 
“highly probative” that there was no evidence after the administration 
of LSD that the veteran suffered any ill effects in terms of 
employability, or effects to his central nervous system.211  The CAVC 
affirmed the Board’s decision based on the idea that the veteran 
consented to LSD experimentation, that he had a pre-existing 
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condition when entering the VA system, and that the “preponderance 
of the evidence shows that the veteran did not incur a superimposed 
disability as the result of VA medical treatment in 1967.”212 
 A second relevant case is Arista v. Shinseki, decided in 2011.213  
The veteran was a munitions systems specialist on active duty from 
1987 to 1992.214  The veteran had filed a claim for service-connection 
for PTSD, but was not able to substantiate his stressor because his 
mission was classified.215  The Board decided that he had not 
submitted “specific enough information” of his stressors.216  While the 
veteran was able to submit a document that was stamped “4-
SECRET,” he was not able to provide enough evidence to convince 
the VA of his claimed stressors.217  The VA continued to request 
records, but the veteran was not able to provide any and, in October 
2006, stated, “I can’t give you buddy letters because the guys I worked 
with can’t say anything either.”218  The CAVC affirmed the Board’s 
denial of the veteran’s claim for PTSD.219  
 These two cases demonstrate that an MKULTRA victim today 
would have a difficult time surmounting the VA’s burden of proof.  
First, because the program aimed to recruit prisoners and hospitalized 
patients with prior drug addictions, later disabilities may be assumed 
to be a result of pre-existing conditions, not a result of LSD dosing. 220  
Second, any condition that was diagnosed after being given LSD will 
                                                 
 
212 See id. at 336.  It should also be noted that when the veteran entered the VA 
system with psychological disabilities, it was a year before the VA recruited him into 
an LSD experimentation program.  Id.  Was the veteran capable of giving informed 
consent to this program?  Is this a program that one could even give informed 
consent to participate in?  We know nothing from the case concerning Boggs’ 
treatment from the time he walked through the doors seeking treatment for 
depression to when the VA recruited him into an LSD program.  See id.  This case 
was appealed to the Federal Circuit, but was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  
Boggs v. Shinseki, 404 F. App’x 472, 474-75 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also 38 U.S.C. § 
7292(d)(2) (2013) (“Except to the extent that an appeal under this chapter presents a 
constitutional issue, the Court of Appeals may not review (A) a challenge to a factual 
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particular case.”). 
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220 See Project MKULTRA, supra note 37, at 391. 
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be difficult to prove in a medical document, such as a letter connecting 
the illness to the LSD, especially if a veteran is only aware that he or 
she was given LSD once.  
Lastly, as the Arista case demonstrates, the veteran must be 
able to access classified records in order to substantiate his claim.221  
In Arista, the veteran was not able to obtain the records that he 
required and was denied his benefits, even though it is not clear if 
records about his injury and actions would have been kept.222  
However, in the case of MKULTRA, records were kept, but often 
ordered to be destroyed by program directors.223  Moreover, there are 
probably documents related to MKULTRA that are still classified.224  
Due to the potential impossibility of an MKULTRA victim obtaining 
records, the question becomes is AZ expansive enough to allow a 
veteran who was subjected to MKULTRA to recover benefits without 
vital documents?  
If a veteran wanted to obtain service-connection benefits for 
receiving unwitting dosages of LSD during service under MKULTRA, 
the veteran will not be able to obtain sufficient records to prove that 
he/she was a test subject.  In light of the absence of records, a veteran 
should be able to use AZ to demonstrate that the lack of records is not 
probative evidence that the veteran was not used as a test subject in 
MKULTRA.225  However, it is important to note that the holding in AZ 
was specific to instances of sexual assault, so courts may be unwilling 
to extend the holding to LSD exposure under MKULTRA.226  
Unreleased documents, or documents destroyed by the government, 
are analogous to records that would not have been kept or recorded in 
the first place.  Both of these scenarios create situations where the 
veteran is not able to substantiate his claim because he is not able to 
prove his in-service injury or harm.  AZ bridged the gap for records 
that would not have existed, and it should also bridge the gap for 
records that the government destroyed or refuses to release. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Based on the policy considerations enumerated in AZ, 
regarding Congress’s legislative intent in creating the VA disability 
system, the “relaxed evidentiary requirements” are supposed to 
promote a veteran-friendly and non-adversarial system.227  Moreover, 
AZ also stated that, to deny a claim based on evidence that would not 
have been kept, would not “comport with a system in which ‘the 
importance of systemic fairness and the appearance of fairness carries 
great weight.’”228  Therefore, in reliance on a system based on fairness 
to the veteran, military destruction of documents that would support a 
veteran’s claim for a service-connection injury should not be held 
against that veteran or his claim.  Even given the negative treatment of 
comparable scenarios in Boggs and Arista, AZ and Helm should 
overcome the evidentiary gaps.  Therefore, MKULTRA victims should 
have at least a colorable argument against the VA as to why they 
deserve service-connection for currently suffered disabilities as a result 
of unwitting exposure to LSD by the government.  
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